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Abstract:  Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve 
inclusion in animal ethics and welfare considerations. Here, we raise questions concerning the 
assessment criteria. We ask how to assess different species for their ability to fulfill the criteria, 
which criteria are most important, how we quantify them (absolute or on a continuum), and how 
non-animals such as fungi and plants fit into this paradigm. 
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Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) build on a growing discussion about the inclusion and 
exclusion of specific animals in ethics and welfare considerations. M&P examine 
consciousness/sentience, cognitive ability, emotion, and the experience of pain to argue that 
invertebrates, specifically arthropods, should be provided with ethical consideration if they meet 
the same criteria as protected vertebrates. Invertebrates are often unfairly categorised as ‘a lower 
class of life’ or ‘simpler’ than vertebrates (Browning and Veit 2020) due to their smaller brain sizes 
and instinctual behaviours. Decades of research, however, indicate that many arthropods show 
evidence of self-awareness (Briffa and Twyman 2011), cognition (Chittka and Niven 2009), and 
other complex behaviours. Arthropods are thought to be sentient (Barron and Klein 2016; Klein 
and Barron 2016), able to experience emotion (Bateson et al. 2011; Mendl et al. 2011), to exhibit 
behavioural differences in personality (Kralj-Fišer and Schuett 2014), and to perform cognitively 
demanding tasks such as arithmetic (Howard et al. 2019a; Howard et al. 2019b); they are even 
able to learn to play ‘soccer’ (Loukola et al. 2017).  
We are inclined to agree with recent commentaries from Vonk (2020) and Levy (2020), 
however, who argue that cognitive complexity, intelligence, and sentience are not the only 
criteria for whether a species should be provided with ethical and welfare consideration. None of 
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the traits mentioned are absolutes; they vary along a continuum. Their presence or absence 
should neither automatically qualify nor disqualify invertebrates for ethical consideration.  
 
1.  Variability in testing.  One difficulty in the criteria M&P set out for ethical consideration is that 
they are not easy to assess. Several arthropods have shown evidence of complex cognitive ability, 
among others bees (specifically honeybees and bumblebees; Avarguès-Weber and Giurfa 2013; 
Dyer 2012; Dyer and Chittka 2004; Loukola et al. 2017; Srinivasan 2010) and ants (Cammaerts and 
Cammaerts 2019a; Cammaerts and Cammaerts 2019b; Cammaerts 2020). The greater 
accessibility for testing of some arthropods than others complicates the issue.  
Social insects such as honeybees, bumblebees and ants, because of their hive 
environments and foraging lifestyles, are easier to test for learning and cognition than solitary 
species. Social insects often work for the hive and so do not lose motivation when satiated; they 
are thus ideal species for studying invertebrate cognition. The relative ease of testing these 
species may result in other arthropods being overlooked, even though they may have similar 
levels of self-awareness, cognitive ability, emotion, and pain or discomfort.  
Observations of behavioural responses are also influenced by our own human perception 
of these behaviours. Larger invertebrates inevitably form the basis of most behavioural and 
physiological analyses because they are easier to manipulate and observe. It is not known how 
much their behaviours can be extrapolated to all invertebrates.  M&P, citing Birch (2017), suggest 
that we apply the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle, which advocates that welfare 
principles be applied to an entire Order where there is reliable scientific evidence of sentience in 
one of the species in that Order. Precautionary principles are not intended to remove all 
possibility of risk (COMEST 2005); they depend on the degree of threat — in this case, the 
likelihood that a species experiences pain, discomfort, or distress.    
 
2.  Which criteria matter?  M&P review the evidence of cognition, sentience, emotion, and the 
experience of pain in arthropods to argue for their inclusion in animal ethics and welfare. 
Questions arise: (i) where do we draw the line on these criteria? and (ii) how many of these criteria 
does an animal need to satisfy to receive ethical consideration? Bees show a range of complex 
behaviours and cognitive abilities including facial recognition (Avarguès-Weber et al. 2010; 
Chittka and Dyer 2012; Dyer et al. 2005), numerical ability (Bortot et al. 2019; Howard et al. 2018; 
Howard et al. 2019b; Howard et al. 2019c; Howard et al. 2019d; Howard et al. 2020), and 
relational learning  (Avarguès-Weber et al. 2011; Giurfa et al. 2001; Howard et al. 2017a; Howard 
et al. 2017b). They also demonstrate subjective experience, evidenced by individual differences 
in learning ability (Dyer et al. 2019; Howard et al. 2019a). Thus, they achieve some of the criteria 
set out by M&P but may fail at other important criteria such as the experience of pain (Groening 
et al. 2017), which has not been conclusively proven or disproven. We therefore need to consider 
what allows an invertebrate to be given ethical consideration. Is it intelligence? Is it the ability to 
experience pain? Is it evidence of self-awareness? Following that is the question of how we 
quantify these criteria, and the level to ascribe as sufficient to merit ethical consideration. Primate 
researchers have long experienced difficulties in quantifying intelligence and cognitive abilities, 
with the diversity and extent of key behaviours being assessed (Reader et al. 2011). Even with 
these assessments, however, judgements need to be made as to which traits are most important; 
and poorly studied species will tend to be ranked lower due to lack of observation. M&P argue 
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for an absolutist approach which implies that any evidence for cognition, sentience, pain etc., 
should be taken as arguing for an inclusion in animal welfare, but these traits are part of a 
continuum, not a binary classification.  
 
3.  Other considerations: Organisms without brains.  Another consideration for the criteria on 
which M&P base their arguments is how to interpret and apply ethical considerations when fungi 
and plants exhibit similar behaviours. Extensive research into slime moulds has shown that they 
have the ability to perform tasks which would be considered ‘higher learning’ in vertebrates. Slime 
moulds are able to navigate mazes (Reid et al. 2012), solve problems (Reid et al. 2016), and use 
speed-accuracy trade-offs (Latty and Beekman 2010). Plants also exhibit information acquisition, 
memory, learning, decision making, and reaction to damage (Calvo Garzón and Keijzer 2011; 
Garzón and Keijzer 2009; Parise et al. 2020). Under some of the criteria set out by M&P, certain 
fungi and plants should also be eligible for ethical consideration. At which point do we determine 
whether a species is deserving of protection? 
 
4.  Conclusions.  M&P have argued that arthropods and other invertebrates should be provided 
with animal ethics protections. Here, we have raised questions about how to assess different 
species for their ability to fulfill the criteria, which criteria are most important, how we quantify 
them, and how non-animals such as fungi and plants fit into this paradigm. As research continues 
to reveal the complexity of invertebrate brains and behaviour, we will need to consider how their 
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